Chapter 7

Structures of desire
Postanarchist kink in the speculative fiction
of Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany

Lewis Call

It's a beautiful universe ... wondrous and the more exciting because no one has
written plays and poems and built sculptures to indicate the structure of desire I
negotiate every day as I move about in it.
-Samuel Delany, Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand

The problem of power is one of the major philosophical and political
preoccupations of the modern West. It is a problem which has drawn the
attention of some of the greatest minds of the nineteenth and twentieth cen
turies, including Fried~ich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. I have argued else
where that the philosophies of power articulated by Nietzsche and Foucault
stand as prototypes of an innovative form of anarchist theory, one which finds
liberatory potential in the disintegration of the modern self and its liberal
humanist politics (Call 2002: chs 1 and 2). Lately this kind of theory has
become known as postanarchism. For me, postanarchism refers to a form of
contemporary anarchist theory which draws extensively upon postmodern and
poststructuralist philosophy in order to push anarchism beyond its traditional
boundaries. Postanarchism tries to do this by adding important new ideas to
anarchism's traditional critiques of statism and capitalism. Two of these ideas
are especially significant for the present essay: the Foucauldian philosophy of
power, which sees power as omnipresent but allows us to distinguish between
power's various forms, and the Lacanian concept of subjectivity, which
understands the self to be constituted by and through its desire.
Postanarchism implies and includes a crucial sexual anarchism. Indeed, the
disruption of conventional forms of sexual identity is one of the most powerful
moves available to the postanarchist. When postanarchism's anti-essentialist
critique is applied to sexuality, the result is queer. When that critique is
applied to power, the result is kinky. Postanarchism enables a system of erotic
ethics suitable for an age beyond humanism. That system endorses radical
relations of erotic power up to and including consensual play-slavery. This
dramatic form of erotic power exchange mimics the structure of slavery~ but in
a way which produces radically different subjective meaning for the partici
pants: unlike slavery, play-slavery can be ethical and erotic. Postanarchism
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suggests that ethical structures of erotic power (including those of play
slavery) may actually sap the authority of their non-consensual Doppelgangers.
I have used the term 'kink theory' to describe the body of work which explores
the ethical possibilities of consensual erotic power exchange (Call 2007). I now
wish to argue that when kink theory encounters postanarchism, the result is
something new and interesting: an ethical position and a strategy for political
action, which I propose to call postanarchist kink.
This essay examines elements of postanarchist kink in the speculative fiction
of two African American authors, Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany.l The
work of Butler and Delany is centrally concerned with the political and ethical
problems of slavery. These two authors provide what amounts to a traditional
anarchist critique of the historical American slave system. However, their
work also endorses erotic power exchange, including forms which seem to
replicate the structures of slavery. Their remarkable novels suggest that an
erotic play-slavery based upon consent and mutual desire may help us over
come the crippling legacy of chattel slavery. In their most radical moments,
Butler and Delany demonstrate that erotic power exchange can facilitate a
breakdown of the traditional political subject; furthermore, they show that
this breakdown is potentially liberating. As Sherryl Vint has recently observed,
Butler and Delany are 'authors whose critical engagement with questions of
sexuality and power pushes the boundaries of the current social configuration'
(Vint 2009: 402). The novels of Butler and Delany suggest, counterintuitively
but convincingly, that one way out of capitalist political economy may lead
through the S/M dungeon: a kinky postanarchism.
The body of theory which I call postanarchist kink was born in the 1980s,
alongside queer theory. In 1984, The Advocate published a groundbreaking
interview with Michel Foucault entitled 'Sex, Power, and the Politics of Iden
tity'. Foucault emphasised the anarchist aspects of queer politics: 'being
homosexuals, we are in a struggle with the government, and the government is
in a struggle with us' (Foucault 1984: 167). This bold, oppositional stance
would become one of the defining features of queer theory, and Foucault's
crucial contributions to that body of theory are well known. Yet Foucault's work
supports more than one radical theory about sexuality. Even as he helped to
create queer theory, he simultaneously contributed to a related critical dis
course, which I have been calling kink theory. The latter discourse studies
the set of practices known collectively· as BDSM: bondage/discipline (B/D) ,
dominance/submission (D/S) and sadomasochism (S/M). Through its study of
these practices, kink theory attempts to theorise the consensual exchange of
erotic power. Kink theory interprets such power exchange as a viable ethical
alternative to the non-consensual power structures which permeate the
modern world. 'What strikes me with regard to S&M', said Foucault, 'is
how it differs from social power' (ibid.: 169). Foucault argued that social
power 'is a strategic relation which has been stabilized through
institutions', while S&M 'is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid' (ibid.).
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For Foucault, kink was important because it showed that even in a world where
power is omnipresent, some of that power flows in accordance with an ethics
of freedom. Anarchists should be very interested in the possibility that this
ethical, erotic power might be deployed as a symbolic challenge to the forms
of social, economic and political power against which they struggle.
Certainly the modern liberal state has taken a strong interest in kink. Foucault's
fellow kink theorist Gayle Rubin noted that the state goes to great lengths to
delegitimise S/M in particular, largely by asserting that those who practice S/M
are 'legally incapable of consenting' to such practices (Rubin 1984: 305).2
So the state tries to contest S/M on precisely the same theoretical terrain where
anarchism attacks the legitimacy of that state: the terrain surrounding the
concept of consent. This struggle over the meaning of consent suggests that
consent means one thing to the state and something very different to anarchists
and kinksters. Wendy Brown has argued compellingly that within liberalism
consent marks the presence of a power to which one submits (Brown 1995:
162-3). Thus the liberal form of consent actually 'marks the subordinate status
of the consenting party' (ibid.: 163). Clearly, liberal consent could not provide
the basis for ethical power relations, since this kind of consent requires and
presumes radical inequalities between the parties. In the liberal model, an
immensely powerful entity (the state) seeks consent from those who possess
little if any power (political subjects, or citizens). Thus, as Brown argues, lib
eral consent is 'a response to power - it adds or withdraws legitimacy - but is
not a mode of enacting or sharing in power' (ibid.).
Here we may draw a sharp line between liberal consent and the kind of consent
which enables relations of erotic power exchange. The structures of erotic consent
are deeply informed by desire, particularly embodied desire. This is rarely, if ever,
the case with the structures of political consent which enable modern liberal
states or with the forms of economic consent which underwrite modern
capit;lism. The consent of the liberal political subject or the capitalist economic
subject can be grudging, indifferent or apathetic. Relations of erotic power, by
the same token, require desire. Mutual desire guarantees the ethical content of
erotic power exchange, for desire ensures that the needs and wishes of the
'subordinate party' will be taken fully into account. In Lacan's famous general
formulation, 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Lacan 1981: 38). Kinky
relations provide a particularly striking example of this. In a typical BDSM
relationship, the dominant desires the desire of the submissive. The submissive's
desire frequently structures negotiations and determines the shape and extent of
the scene. By endorsing and emphasising the desire of the submissive, BDSM
promotes a high level of equality between the participants. This equality may
sometimes lie hidden behind the apparent inequality generated by the BDSM
roles themselves, and confusion around this issue may motivate many moral
critiques of kink (Highleyman 1997: para. 10). A form of consent which pro
motes such equality, and which fully respects the desires of all parties involved,
could be compatible with anarchism, while the liberal form of consent cannot.
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Perhaps the practices of kinksters, and the concept of desiring consent which
stands behind those practices, represent a real challenge to the modern state
and its political theories. Some anarchists have already begun to recognise this
possibility. A 2002 issue of Organise!, the magazine of Britain's Anarchist
Federation, called for 'safe, free, diverse and consensual' sex. The magazine
ran an 'Interview with an Anarchist Dominatrix', one Mistress Venus. Mistress
Venus clearly understands how to wield symbolic power against the dominant
order. She defines the domination session as an 'escape from reality' (Anarchist
Federation 2002: 8). But this does not appear to be a nihilistic 'escape' into
non-reality. Rather, it looks very much like an attempt to critique the symbolic
order of modern capitalism. Mistress Venus does this by developing an alter
native symbolic order, one in which symbols of power are redeployed in sub
versive ways. If this strategy is successful, these redeployed symbols may
challenge or undermine the authority of the conventional symbolic order.
Mistress Venus suggests that
the roles we play mirror the power-based capitalistic society we live in today,
a society of greed, oppression and subversion, a society of force, silence
and pain. This is in no way representative of the lifestyle I choose to live
in as an anarchist, a society based on equality, respect and self-government.
Domination is a game, the adult's version of what children call 'playing'.
(Anarchist Federation 2002: 8)3
Here Mistress Venus acknowledges the crucial contribution which kink can make
to anarchism. As she points out, kink reflects the non-consensual, real world
power relations which anarchists universally condemn. Yet this reflection is
always consensual, desired and playful. Kink performs real world power rela
tionships in a way which simultaneously critiques those relations and offers a
vital ethical alternative. As Liz Highleyman argues, S/M role-playing can be
used 'to challenge illegitimate authority. Most SM players believe that such
play is a parody of real world authority rather than an imitation of it' (High
leyman 1997: para. 24). The strategy here is to reproduce the structure of real
world power relations, but to do so in a way that will radically alter the sub
jective significance of those relations. The idea, in Highleyman's wonderful
formulation, is to 'subvert, pervert, and make overt the erotic subtext of
power and authority' (ibid.: para. 27). This has the potential to reduce the
psychological power of real world authority, and surely that is a step in the
direction of anarchist liberation.
If it is to realise this potential, however, postanarchist kink must be careful
not to slip back into a liberal humanist philosophy or politics. Judy Greenway
has argued that
even when sexual transgression seems to be about creating new versions of
sexuality, the language of the true inner self recurs ... Sometimes, for
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instance in the debates around the limits of consensual sado-masochism,
its defenders use the traditional rhetoric of civil liberties, maintaining the
publidprivate distinction.
(Greenway 1997: 8)
Indeed, this does represent a serious potential problem for postanarchist kink
theory. The risk here is that kinky desire might inadvertently produce a pro
blematic kind of identity politics. This politics would depend for its very
existence upon the liberal humanist subject and the liberal state, both of which
postanarchism seeks to subvert. Wendy Brown has formulated this problem
quite effectively. Her analysis convincingly suggests that identity politics
cannot possibly be deployed against the modern state. Brown argues elo
quently that 'politicized identities generated out of liberal, disciplinary socie
ties, insofar as they are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal, require
that ideal, as well as their exclusion from it, for their own continuing existence
as identities' (Brown 1995: 65). If Brown is right about this, then a kinky
identity politics will be of little use to anarchism.
The source of this problem is desire; more specifically, it is the troubling
way in which identity politics seem to channel desire within a liberal order.
Thus Brown speaks of 'politicized identity's desire within liberal-bureaucratic
regimes, its foreclosure of its own freedom' (ibid.: 66). For Brown this is a
reactionary desire, one which grows out of a kind of Nietzschean ressentiment.
Brown emphasises the 'structure of desire fueling identity-based political
claims' (ibid.: 62). I believe that this term 'structure of desire' (also used by
Delany) provides the key that may unlock kink's radical potential. Specifically,
I suggest that we must strive to distinguish the reactionary structure of desire
which Brown has ably identified from a very different structure of desire. The
structure I have in mind would describe the desire of postmodern subjects:
deeply embodied, without fixed or stable identities. The identities of these
subjects would fluctuate too rapidly and too dramatically for identity
politics to emerge. This would also be a structure of kinky desire. As Jamie
Heckert has observed, the 'poststructuralist argument on the potential fluidity
of the self' suggests that S/M could be used to 'redefine the meaning of power
play', though Heckert rightly warns us that this project may not be for every
one, and that it should only be pursued with great care and caution (Heckert
2005: 208-9). The concept of fluidity is crucial here: kink has the potential to
add flexible, fluid power relations to the fluid identity structures which post
structuralism has identified. 'SM roles are so fluid', observes Highleyman; '[a]n
SM role is not predetermined on the basis of one's occupation, gender, sexual
orientation, race, or class, and each partner may take on the role(s) that
meet their individual or collective desires' (Highleyman 1997: para. 25). Simi
larly, Foucault points out that in S/M there are roles, but these-.can be
reversed; even when the roles are stabilised, they are clearly part of a game
(Foucault 1984: 169).
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Certainly many kinksters identify with particular posltIons within the
structure of erotic power relations. Many claim specific identities for them
selves, often introducing themselves as tops or bottoms, dominants or sub
missives, masters or slaves. But many also switch (at least in my experience).
Here desire takes priority over specific roles or identities. Within such a
structure of desire, identities and power relations are in a constant state of
flux. Because the stable subject required by liberal humanism cannot emerge
from this structure of desire, I call it postanarchist.
Postanarchist kink sees power not as a problem but as a possibility. Foucault
showed us that the attempt to eliminate power is absurd. Rather than attacking
power, we might draw careful distinctions between different kinds of power.
We should entertain the hypothesis that it is, after all, possible to exercise
power in an ethically responsible way. Indeed, as Highleyman astutely
observes, 'the idea that we can use SM to learn to use power in an ethical way
remains, along with consent, the crux of the moral defense of erotic dom
inance and submission' (Highleyman 1997: para. 38). The key to this ethical
possibility is to be found in the philosophy of consent and desire embodied in the
practices of erotic power exchange. According to this philosophy, the exchange
of power is ethically legitimate if and only if all persons involved consent to
that exchange and desire it. These criteria permit erotic power exchange
to stand as a dramatic ethical alternative to non-consensual, undesired power.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the crucial differences between
these two forms of power, I will examine a body of literature which addresses
both forms: the speculative fiction of Octavia Butler and Samuel Delany. These
two African American authors are deeply aware of the massive historical
traumas which have resulted from the exercise of non-consensual political and
economic power, particularly in the American South prior to the Civil War.
(As a white male American, I experience these traumas much less directly and in
a very different way. As a postanarchist historian, I believe that we can learn
from these traumas.) Butler and Delany are especially aware of the problems
of sexual exploitation endemic in the American slave system, an awareness they
share with other well-known African American authors like Toni Morrison
and Alice Walker. 4 But Butler and Delany go further than many of their peers,
for they not only provide a compelling critique of the political and sexual econo
mies of slavery, they also provide an alternative. For Butler and Delany, erotic
power exchange and play-slavery provide an antidote to the ethically bankrupt
institution of slavery. These two authors thus offer us a way to begin healing the
wounds which chattel slavery has left upon our culture and its philosophy of ethics.

Becoming a kind of master: postanarchist kink
in Octavia Butler's Patternist books
As an African American woman who writes science fiction, Octavia Butler
speaks from a triply marginalised subject position. She is a woman writing in a
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field which is dominated by male authors. She is an African American writing
in a field dominated by white authors. And by choosing to write science fic
tion, she has elected to participate in a field which is itself marginal to litera
ture - a 'paraliterary' field, to use Delany's terminology. Since this last
marginalisation, at least, represents a choice on Butler's part, we must consider
the possibility that she wants to speak from the margins. Indeed, it is possible
that Butler has things to say which can be said only at the margins. Butler's
work deals with themes of power and slavery - hardly unusual concerns for an
African American writer. But by choosing to write science fiction, Butler gives
herself the opportunity to approach these themes in a way which is radically
different from the approaches of mainstream literature. Certainly we find in
Butler a compelling and elegant critique of socio-economic slavery, and of the
forms of power which sustain that system. But there is also another kind of
power at work in Butler's writing. Lauren J. Lacey argues quite convincingly
that 'Butler's last three novels [Parable of the Sower, Parable of the Talents
and Fledgling] work through the complexities of power in ways that offer
possibilities for contemporary feminists - and others - to cope with and even
to profit from the power formations that surround us' (Lacey 2008: 380).
While Lacey is right to say that Butler's later novels show us the positive
political possibilities of power, this theme is not a new one for Butler. It can
also be found in her earliest published work, the Patternist series.
Butler quite rightly rejects the sort of power which produced master-slave
relations in the antebellum American South. In her Patternist series, she describes
these relations in terms which will make sense to a largely white science fiction
audience who may not be entirely familiar with the political economy of slav
ery. Butler accomplishes this by locating her slave society in a future world
which is ruled by a group of powerful telepaths. These telepaths share access
to a grid of mental energy known as the Pattern. The Pattern is strictly hier
archical. This hierarchical structure makes the Pattern a tempting target for
anarchist critique, which Butler deploys without naming it as such. The
strongest telepath within the Pattern is known as the Patternmaster, and this
individual has the ability to exercise non-consensual telepathic control over the
other Patternists. The Patternmaster delegates power to Housemasters, who
also use their power in a non-consensual way. Butler describes a Housemaster
called Coransee as someone who 'radiated power in the way of a man not only
confident but arrogant' (Butler 1976: 15).
The parallels between these Housemasters and nineteenth-century American
plantation owners are unmistakable. Housemasters are in general very com
petitive, yet they 'had a tradition of returning one another's runaways' (ibid.: 75).
Like their real world counterparts, Housemasters recognise that they share a
common interest in maintaining the slave system. The Housemasters also
reproduce the reprehensible gender relations of the plantation economy. It
was, of course, common practice in the American South for slavemasters to
rape their female slaves, in order to ensure the reproduction of the slave
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population. Similarly, Housemaster Coransee knows that 'no woman of his
House had the right to refuse him' (ibid.: 158). For women Patternists espe
cially, non-consensual, undesired power is the very essence of the Pattern. And
yet these Patternist women yearn for precisely the same kind of power which
has traditionally been used against them. 'I want the same thing you want',
says a Patternist woman named Amber; 'My House. Mine' (ibid.: 134). One of
the most painful truths about non-consensual power is that those who are
victimised by such power often respond by dreaming not of a liberated and
egalitarian society, but of a world in which that power flows through their
hands instead of the hands of their masters. This psychological aspect of the
slave system makes it fairly simple to divide the slave population and turn the
slaves against one another. Distinctions are drawn in Butler's Houses between
the more prestigious household slaves and the lower-ranking 'outsiders'. This
closely parallels the distinction between house and field slaves in the ante
bellum American South. Starved of power, the outsiders often abuse the only
people who are below them in the Patternist social hierarchy: those who lack
telepathic powers altogether, the 'mutes'. For example, 'there was an outsider
who had researched ancient methods of torture and made a hobby of trying
them on mutes' (ibid.: 68).
The mutes are clearly an important part of the slave system which the Pat
ternist series describes. In the profoundly hierarchical structure of the Pattern,
they are the lowest of all groups. Their inequality is largely based upon their
lack of telepathic power (which stands in Butler's work as a surrogate for
unequal levels of economic power in the American South). But the most honest
of Butler's characters understand that this inequality is also linguistic in origin.
Consider this conversation between the immortal shape-shifting woman Emma
(also known as Anyanwu) and Doro, patriarchal progenitor of the Pattern:
'Mutes!'
He looked annoyed, probably with himself. 'It's a convenient term.
People without telepathic voices. Ordinary people.'
'I know what it means, Doro. I knew the first time I heard Mary use it.
It means nigger!'
(Butler 1977: 161)
Although the Pattern is the result of an extended breeding programme carried
out by the immortal Doro, he is, ironically, a mute. However, Doro does have
the ability to transfer his mind into another person's body. In doing so, he
permanently extinguishes that person's consciousness. Doro has lived for mil
lennia in this way, hopping from one body to another, 'consuming' the minds
which inhabit these bodies. Not surprisingly, Doro emerges in Butler's narra
tive as the ultimate slavemaster. He can kill at will, but he cannot be killed.
His power is absolute and unquestionable. He is also completely unconcerned
about the pain of others. 'It was rare for another person's pain to disturb
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Doro. If the girl seemed to be dying, he would be concerned that good seed
was about to be lost. But if she were merely in agony, it did not matter'
(Butler 1980: 184). Indeed, Doro derives sadistic pleasure from the act of kill
ing, especially when his victim is mentally or telepathically sensitive. Doro
explains that he is able to recognise 'the kinds of people that I would get the
most pleasure from if I took them. I guess you could say, the kinds of people
who tasted best' (Butler 1977: 97). Thus Doro is not merely a sadist; he is a
kind of psychic cannibal who enjoys consuming the mental energy of his victims.
But there is also another motivation for Doro's cruelty: 'Doro wanted an
empire. He didn't call it that, but that was what he meant ... He needed tools,
because an empire of ordinary people wasn't quite what he had in mind' (ibid.:
92-3). Doro's slaves are his tools. He uses them to enhance and increase his
political power. Yet there is another form of power which is even more
important to Doro. Foucault called it 'bio-power', that which 'brought life and
its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations' (Foucault 1978: 143).
Just as a nineteenth-century American slave owner would always be concerned
about the size of his 'herd', Doro is obsessed with his breeding programme.
'Had human life ever mattered to Doro beyond his interest in human husban
dry?' (Butler 1977: 55). In this context, Doro's power is largely biological in
origin, since he controls the breeding programme. But again, Butler reminds us
that power is always partly linguistic. 'Breed didn't sound like the kind of
word that should be applied to people. The minute he said it, though, I rea
lized it was the right word for what he was doing' (ibid.: 96). Doro's breeding
programme is partly enabled by language's reluctance to name it as such. So
Butler combines a radical critique of bio-power with an almost structuralist
critique of linguistic power: her project has clear Foucauldian affinities.
Like any slavemaster, Doro regards the children born to his 'breeders' not as
people but as his property. 'The daughter had been his from the moment of
her conception - his property as surely as though his brand were burned into
her flesh. She even thought of herself as his property' (Butler 1980: 150).
Doro's dehumanising breeding project thus exhibits all the worst features of
nineteenth-century American slavery.
But, as Foucault reminds us, 'there are no relations of power without resis
tances' (Foucault 1980: 142). The nineteenth century was a time not only of
slavery but of slave revolts. In the Patternist books, these revolts arrive in the
person of Mary, the protagonist of Mind of My Mind. Mary is the end result
of Doro's breeding programme. It is her telepathic power that establishes the
Pattern itself. Her relationship with Dora ranges from tense to antagonistic,
and much of this antagonism stems from Mary's resentment of Doro's power:
'What am I for, Doro? What are you progressing toward?'
'You know the answer to that.'
'Your race, your empire, yes, but what place is there in it for me?'
.
(Butler 1977: 101)
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As Mary joins with other telepaths to form the Pattern, her power increases
dramatically. One of the first to notice this change is Mary's husband Karl, a
strong telepath who had once dominated Mary:
'You're changing. I've been watching you change, wondering how far you
would go.'
'Changing how?'
'Growing up perhaps. I can remember when it was easier to intimidate
you.'·
(Butler 1977: 188)
Gradually Doro, too, comes to realise that he can no longer control Mary as
he once did. Indeed, as a mute, Doro remains shut out of the Pattern. 'Toge
ther, the "Patternists" were growing into something that he could observe,
hamper, or destroy but not something he could join' (ibid: 155). Naturally, this
necessitates a war between Doro and Mary. Doro is immensely powerful,
but Mary is more powerful still, for she has the strength of her Patternists to
draw upon. Mary does not merely have power, 'she was power, strength con
centrated as Doro had never felt it before - the strength of dozens, perhaps
hundreds of Patternists' (ibid.: 217, emphasis added). In the end, even
Doro can't stand against such strength. At the conclusion of Mind of My
Mind, Doro is himself enslaved, then extinguished: 'He was a member of the
Pattern. A Patternist. Property. Mary's property ... She consumed him slowly,
drinking in his terror and his life, drawing out her own pleasure, and laughing
through his soundless screams' (ibid.: 220). This is a dramatic, ironic reversal
of fortune for a man who has been enslaving and consuming others for
millennia.
As satisfying as it surely is to see the tables turned on Doro, however, we
cannot assume that Mary will be able to escape the temptations of non
consensual power. She may be destined to become a female Doro. The tendency
among feminist critics, however, has been to argue otherwise. Marleen Barr
maintains that Mary 'uses her power to create a new community, a new body
of men and women' (Barr 1987: 77). Similarly, Robin Roberts suggests that
Mary is a kind of nurturing 'queen bee' whose community-centred values
make her preferable to the patriarchal Doro (Roberts 1993: 107). Unfortu
nately, we don't really know for certain how Mary's regime will compare to
that of Doro. Her rule is established at the very end of Mind of My Mind, and
develops within the narrative gap which exists between that book and Clay's
Ark. But we may reasonably imagine that Mary - a former slave herself - at
least has the potential to feel sympathy for those she dominates, as Doro could
not. And Butler does show us enough of Mary's relationship with the Patter
nists in Mind of My Mind to convince us that Mary does genuinely care for
her telepaths, that she sees them not as breeding stock but as members of a
vibrant organic community. Still, we cannot ignore the fact that while Mary's
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regime may be more nurturing and more organic than Doro's, it remains a
non-consensual slave system nonetheless. Members of the Pattern have no
choice but to participate, and all are forced to acknowledge Mary's absolute
power.
.
It is only in the final volume of the Patternist series, Wild Seed, that Butler
shows us an egalitarian relationship based upon the exchange of erotic power.
Though Wild Seed was one of the last books to appear in the Patternist series,
it represents the beginning of the narrative which runs through that series.
(The tension between these two sequences - publication and narrative - is one
way in which Butler's work refuses the too-convenient comforts of linear
narrative.) Wild Seed tells us of Doro's origins, and of his centuries-spanning
power struggle with the immortal shape-shifting woman called Anyanwu.
That this is a political struggle is clear; Stacy Alaimo has described it as 'a
battle between two modes of knowing and being: the tyrannical force of an
egotistical, disembodied mind and the transformative powers of an utterly
embodied woman' (Alaimo 1998: 126). In one sense, then, this is the story of
the postmodern body's revenge upon the Enlightenment's mythology of human
subjectivity. But Wild Seed is much more than that. It is also an account of the
ways- in which power and desire flow between Doro and Anyanwu. It is, in
short, a sadomasochistic love story.
Like any dominant, Doro finds that what he wants more than anything
else is Anyanwu's submission. Lacan might say Doro desires the desire of
the Other. The problem is that Anyanwu is 'wild seed'. She is a genetic aber
ration, and not the product of Doro's selective breeding programme. She is
thus quite difficult to control, but Doro hopes that, 'like no other wild seed,
Anyanwu would learn to fear him and bend herself to his will' (Butler 1980: 90).
He will settle for nothing less than total obedience. Anyanwu must even learn
to define ethics in Doro's terms. 'She would learn that right and wrong were
what he said they were' (ibid.: 92). Yet, time and time again, Doro is fru
strated in his quest to gain power over Anyanwu. She remains untameable.
'What will I have to do next to teach you to obey?' Doro laments (ibid.: 176).
When Anyanwu finally does begin to submit, it is only because her instincts of
self-preservation are strong. She knows that Doro could kill her; to protect
herself, she submits. This is not (yet) an ethical or erotic submission: she sub
mits out of necessity, without desire. Thus 'Doro had reshaped her. She had
submitted and submitted and submitted to keep him from killing her ...
she had formed the habit of submission' (ibid.: 196). But that is not all she
develops. Anyanwu comes to enjoy Doro's attentions: 'Anyanwu enjoyed
his touches even now when she thought they were more imprisoning than
caressing' (ibid.: 94). In short, she learns to eroticise the power relations which
exist between her and Doro. By doing so, she alters the basic nature of their
relationship.
The erotic power which begins to flow between Anyanwu and Doro
becomes entirely distinct from the ethically problematic forms of power which

142

Lewis Call

Butler described in the previous Patternist books. One crucial difference is that
these power relations are based upon reciprocal desire. Another important
difference is that they are reversible. Here the joke, as always, is on Doro.
From the very moment that Doro attains erotic mastery over Anyanwu, he
begins to develop what Hegel called a 'dependent consciousness'.5 Doro is
enslaved by his desire for Anyanwu, by his all-consuming need to dominate the
one woman who could possibly be his equal. It takes Doro several centuries
and an entire novel to realise that this is happening to him. Anyanwu, how
ever, articulates her strategy on page 9 of Wild Seed: 'She knew some people
were masters and some were slaves. That was the way it had always been ...
She had become a kind of master herself. "Sometimes, one must become a
master to avoid becoming a slave," she said softly' (ibid.: 9). This, then, is the
dance which these two immortals perform through the centuries: 'mastering'
and 'enslaving' one another in a permanent spiral of mutual desire.
The culmination of the erotic relationship between Anyanwu and Doro
occurs near the end of the novel. In a scene which is deeply charged with erotic
energy, Doro feeds upon Anyanwu's life essence, taking her as close to death
as he can without killing her. The scene reveals the depths of Doro's desires,
and the extent to which he is controlled by those desires:
'I had to know you that way at least once,' he said. 'I had to touch you
that way.'
'Why?' she asked.
'Because it's the closest I'll ever come to you.'
(Butler 1980: 259)
This remarkable kinky love scene highlights the importance of mutual, con
sensual desire. Doro 'wondered what she would say if he told her no one had
ever before enjoyed such contact with him. No one in nearly four thousand
years ... But Anyanwu had participated, had enjoyed, had even taken the
initiative for a while, greatly intensifying his pleasure' (ibid.: 260). For millen
nia, Doro has been a psychic rapist, consuming people's consciousness against
their will. Now he is astonished to discover that what he really wants and
needs is not an unwilling victim but a partner, someone who genuinely enjoys
the exchange of power and can participate in that exchange as an equal. Here
is the supreme irony: Anyanwu has made the ultimate submission to Doro. She
has offered him her life. And yet by doing so, she has gained total power
over him. Through the reciprocal, consensual exchange of power and desire,
Anyanwu has accomplished something truly remarkable. She has reappro
priated slavery, and transformed it from an ethical abomination into some
thing beautiful. She has discovered a kind of erotic play-slavery. Wild Seed
presents this play-slavery as an effective strategic and symbolic challenge to
Doro's ugly, empire-building slavery. A text would have to be kinky and
postanarchist to achieve something like that.
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A land of wholly inverted values: postanarchist kink
in Samuel Delany's Neveryon books
Like Butler, Samuel Delany speaks from the literary and erotic margins.
Indeed, many of his most interesting· ideas can be articulated only from a
position which is marginal to mainstream literature and sexuality. Those
interpretations of Delany's work which fail to recognise this are doomed to
remain incomplete. In her frequently cited essay on 'Recent Feminist Utopias',
for example, Joanna Russ makes the rather astonishing claim that Delany
writes from an 'implicit level of freedom' simply because he is male (Russ
1981: 83). Russ chooses to disregard the ways in which Delany, a gay African
American who writes S/F about S/M, is automatically relegated to the margin
of the margins. As science fiction, Delany's texts are marginal to literature.
There is a subtle but persistent concern for race in Delany's work, and this is
certainly enough to make his project marginal to that of white literature. His
elaborate articulation of gay themes makes his writing marginal to hetero
sexual literature. And his frequent discussions of S/M make his work marginal
to vanilla literature. By focusing only on Delany's gender, Russ disregards these
important margins. Damien Broderick gets a bit closer; he recognises that, as a
gay black man, Delany does write about marginal experience (Broderick
1995: 120). And yet Broderick still does not give us a complete picture of
Delany's work. He ends up suggesting, rather implausibly, that Delany's 'fic
tion is articulated about a semiotic programme which seems, at its limit, to
merge with humanist, albeit highly relativist, liberal pluralism' (ibid.: 138). This
misconception stems from the fact that Broderick acknowledges some of the
margins which Delany occupies (gay/black) but disregards another (kinky).
This is an essential omission, for it is precisely Delany's commitment to the
principles of erotic power exchange that makes his work incompatible with the
tradition of liberal humanism. Humanism has amply demonstrated that it has
room for a great many different identities, including those of ethnic minority
groups and possibly even homosexuals. But it has not, so far, shown that it
has any room for kink, and the one thing it has not yet learned to tolerate is
frank discussions of power. Delany's work points us not towards any liberal
humanism (however pluralist), but rather towards a kinky postanarchism.
Delany is a deeply political thinker, with a strong sense of ethics. Nowhere
is this more clear than in his philosophy of kink. The cornerstone of Delany's
system of erotic ethics is a principle of consent informed by desire, which is
something that his system has in common with many anarchist ethical philo
sophies. In a number of ways, in a variety of different texts, Delany makes this
fundamental point: desired and consensual forms of power exchange are ethi
cally acceptable and potentially erotic; undesired, non-consensual forms of
power are intrinsically unethical and non-erotic. Delany is especially careful to
articulate the vital distinction between erotic and political power: 'To'·assume
a session of "sexual torture" between two consenting adults requires only
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minimal reorganization of what goes on in an actual session of political
torture - and in any way manifests the same "power relations" - signs only
gross ignorance of the context and the substance of both situations!' (Delany
1994: 140). It is ethics, of course, which separates the two situations. In Stars
in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, Delany highlights and sharpens this ethical
point by describing a world in which 'all sadomasochism was hunted out and
punished with barbaric singlemindedness; especially if concert [sic] was writ
ten out or clearly specified by verbal contract, which their authorities con
sidered the ultimate disease' (Delany 1984: 215). Reading this passage, one
experiences a remarkable ethical vertigo: why should consensual S/M be
repressed in particular? What is it about such practices that the state might
find so troubling? Perhaps it is the fact that consensual erotic power exchange
threatens the state's jealously guarded (and non-consensual) power monopoly.
That would be a very anarchist interpretation.
Like Butler, Delany provides extensive meditations qn slavery. And like
Butler, Delany understands that 'slavery' can refer either to a non-consensual
set of socio-economic relations or to the consensual eroticisation of such rela
tions. (This eroticisation represents a particular form of the more general
practice of erotic power exchange.) Indeed, 'slavery' is a slippery signifier
which can sometimes slide back and forth between the two meanings. Delany's
Gorgik is a character who has experienced both real slavery and play-slavery;
he seems to feel that one can lead to another: 'Fire, slavery, cloth, coin, and
stone - these are the basis of civilized life. Sometimes it happens that one or
another of them gets hopelessly involved in the most basic appetites of a
woman or a man' (Delany 1979: 143). But Delany also recognises that the
eroticisation of class relations represents a potentially potent threat to the domi
nant social order: 'The easier it is to name, survey, and pathologize the erotici
zation of any particular set of class relations, then the more dangerous that set
of relations - and their eroticization - is to patriarchal status quo phallocentric
society' (Delany ·1994: 136). S/M eroticises the class relations which are such a
fundamental part of chattel slavery; by this logic, S/M must be one of the most
dangerous forces ever unleashed against the patriarchy. For no erotic practice
has been more thoroughly catalogued, more ruthlessly medicalised. From
Krafft-Ebing's vast nineteenth-century inventory of perversions to today's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, erotic power exchange
has remained one of psychology's great obsessions. 6 It's no wonder that the
patriarchy has done everything within its considerable power to control the
discourse surrounding S/M, for as long as S/M remains trapped within the
psychiatric discourse, the threat which it represents is contained.
Clearly, Delany is fascinated by the politics of kink, and he has devoted
considerable paraliterary effort to the exploration of these politics. Erotic
power relations are at the thematic core of the multi-volume sword and
sorcery epic which Delany initiated in 1979 with Tales of Neveryon. Delany
tells us that it was in these stories that he 'turned to examine some of the real
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(i.e., again, I mean political) problems that the idea of S/M brings up' (Delany
1999: 118). And it's clear that this exploration has a deep personal significance
for him. 'Should you really want to know what this weird Delany guy is all
about, these are the books to wrestle with', Delany assures us (ibid.: 119). But
why did Delany choose the much-maligned genre of sword and sorcery fantasy
as the forum in which to speak about ideas which are clearly so important to
him? He recognises that sword and sorcery is 'SF's despised younger cousin'
(Delany 1994: 46). Indeed, he goes out of his way to emphasise that sword and
sorcery represents 'the margin of the margin' (ibid.: 71). Perhaps, then, Delan.y
chose sword and sorcery precisely because it is marginal - indeed, because It
exists on the margins of an already marginal paraliterary genre called science
fiction. After all, such a doubly marginal genre is perfect for a discussion of
that most marginal of sexual strategies, erotic power exchange. By choosing
sword and sorcery, Delany is not merely accepting marginal status. He is
insisting upon it.
Like almost all of Delany's books, the Neveryon stories draw very clear
lines between non-consensual socio-economic power and consensual, desired
erotic power. Delany is especially careful to distinguish slavery from play
slavery. Neveryon is a slave society, and Neveryon's slave system reproduces
the power relations of the antebellum American South, down to the last detail.
Delany is careful to emphasise, for example, the special status of the favoured
administrative ('house') slaves, who in Neveryon wear ornate covers over their
iron slave collars as a sign of relative rank. Of course, these elite slaves must
contend with the inevitable feelings of guilt and complicity which result from
their collaboration with slavery. Collar covers 'add far more weight to the
neck than the circle of iron they cover', observes one house slave (Delany 1979: 224).
Delany uses the symbol of the collar cover to illustrate the morass of moral
dilemmas which slavery inevitably produces.
In order to ensure that the Neverjion series can describe the entire his
tory of slavery, Delany employs a clever technique of narrative acceleration.
Historical developments which took centuries in the real world take dec
ades in Neveryon. This allows characters to comment on broad historical
transformations. Some of these characters are able to describe the problems
that emerge when slaves are emancipated. 'Freedom is not so simple a
thing as that', a house slave points out when confronted with possible liberation.
'Where do you expect us to go? If we leave here, what do you expect will
happen to us?' (ibid.: 221). Here Delany recognises that the transition from a
traditional economy based on chattel slavery to a market economy based on
formally free wage labour will not be an easy one. The former slaves who
join the ranks of the impoverished urban working class may find that their
lives have not improved. Indeed, another house slave argues that 'you free
the labor pens into a world where, at least in the cities and the larger
towns, a wage-earning populace, many of them, is worse off than here'
(ibid.: 225).
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Despite these potential (and, in the case of American history, very real)
problems, many citizens of Neveryon are willing to fight for the abolition of
slavery, under the leadership of a former slave known as Gorgik the Liberator.
Delany makes it easy to see why slavery arouses such intense anger. The ethical
atrocities which result from this kind of non-consensual socio-economic power
are clear, particularly when Delany examines the sexual dimension of the slave
system. In Neveryon, as in the antebellum American south, slavery encourages
rape and other forms of sexual abuse. Long before he begins his campaign
against slavery, Gorgik (not yet 'the Liberator') visits the slave market. 'Buy
me, lord!' begs a woman slave. 'You will take me, please, away from him! We
go to the desert tribes and I'll be sold there again. Do you know what they do
to women slaves in the desert? I was there before. I don't want to go back'
(ibid.: 135). Surely few moral crusades could be more inspirational than the
campaign to end to such violations.
And yet the same narrative which contains this thorough critique of socio
economic slavery also includes a very sympathetic portrayal of consensual,
desired play-slavery. Gorgik does not buy the woman at the slave market.
Instead, he purchases a slave boy called Small Sarg. Sarg suggests that Gorgik
should have bought the woman instead, for he could have had her work by
day, her body by night. Gorgik replies, 'you think I'll get any less from you?'
(ibid.: 137). At first, this sounds like another example of non-consensual sexual
slavery. But in fact the relationship between Gorgik and Sarg is far more
complex than that. The first time Gorgik approaches Sarg sexually, he informs
Sarg that the boy must wear a slave collar this time, but that on another night
Gorgik will take the collar off Sarg and put it on himself (ibid: 143). It turns
out that Gorgik's sexuality is directly linked to the symbol of slavery. It
doesn't matter to him which partner wears the collar, because the roles are
reversible, as they often are in S/M (Foucault 1984: 169). The specific power
configuration of Gorgik and Sarg's first encounter seems quite arbitrary:
Gorgik refuses to wear the collar himself only because he does 'not feel like
wearing it ... at least tonight' (Delany 1979: 143).
Even if we read the first encounter between Gorgik and Sarg as non
consensual, this aspect of their relationship seems to last no longer than one night.
The next morning, Sarg awakes to find Gorgik asleep, the collar off. Sarg slips
away and could easily have escaped. He finds a girl hiding in the bushes; the
first thing she says to him is 'you're not a slave now' (ibid.: 145). Perhaps to
emphasise this, Delany has the girl repeat this point twice more: 'you are a
slave no longer' and 'you are not a slave any more' (ibid.: 148). This triple
invocation, formulated a bit differently each time, suggests that Sarg has
indeed left socio-economic slavery behind. He chooses to stay with Gorgik,
shares desire with him and fights by his side. Gorgik does sometimes wear the
collar; when he does, he calls Sarg 'little master' (ibid.: 234). When Gorgik
tries to explain the nature of their relationship to others, he claims that 'we are
both free men' (ibid.: 237). The reality, however, is that neither is free, for they
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are both enchained by mutual desire. By participating in a kind of play-slavery,
Gorgik and Small Sarg reappropriate the symbolic structure of the socio-economic
slavery which they hate, and use that structure to fulfil their erotic needs.
Certainly, Delany is well aware of the explosive danger which is contained
within such play-slavery. In Nevery6na, the second volume of the Neveryon
series, Small Sarg turns against Gorgik. 'Before you sits a man whose every
word and act is impelled by lusts as depraved as any in the nation, who would
make a slave of all and anyone to satisfy them, calling such satisfaction free
dom!' says Sarg of his former lover (Delany 1983: 77). We don't know what,
exactly, caused Sarg to reject the relationship which he once shared with
Gorgik; these developments occur 'off-stage', outside Delany's narrative. But
the fact that Sarg was able to leave Gorgik is important. As Highleyman
observes, a play-slave 'has an out', and this is one thing that makes his situa
tion very different from that of African American slaves in the nineteenth
century (Highleyman 1997: para. 16). Sarg tries to kill Gorgik, but Sarg himself
is killed in the ensuing conflict. Yet even though Small Sarg has just tried to
kill him, Gorgik will allow no ill to be spoken of his former lover. 'But that
man, dead on the tile, was also a friend - once', Gorgik declares. 'Had his
friendship not been so great, his hatred might have been less' (Delany 1983: 87).
Gorgik still remembers Sarg fondly, and even Sarg's betrayal is not enough to
dissuade Gorgik from his campaign to bring ethics to power. As always,
he continues this campaign on two simultaneous fronts, waging a guerrilla
campaign against the institution of slavery while also deploying erotic power
relations as a dramatic ethical alternative to that institution. Flight From
Neveryon, the third volume in the series, finds Gorgik in another kinky rela
tionship, this time with a one-eyed former mine slave called Noyeed. Gorgik
and Noyeed develop their relationship consciously, with great deliberation and
care. 'What we do together, you and I,' says Noyeed, 'we do very much
awake' (Delany 1985: 123). Noyeed and Gorgik recognise the dangers inherent
in a relationship such as theirs, and they are mindful of the example of
Small Sarg. Nonetheless, they still choose erotic play-slavery, as a liberating
alternative to the socio-economic slave system which they fight by day.
I must, therefore, strongly contest the interpretation advanced by Robert
Elliot Fox. In his study of sexual politics in Delany's work, Fox asserts that
one of the things which is so thoroughly repulsive about the master/slave
relationship in sado-masochism is that it is a psychosexual parody of a
relationship (which, to be sure, had its own psychosexual aspect) invol
ving large masses of people, not just individuals, under conditions of the
most overt compulsion.
(Fox 1996: 52)
Here Fox completely fails to grasp the nature of consensual, desired play
slavery. On Delany's worlds and moons, this type of 'slavery' represents a
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liberation precisely because it replaces a non-consensual form of slavery 
which both liberals and anarchists would probably find repulsive - with a
form of play based upon consent and mutual desire. In the land of Neveryon,
it is not the radicalness of Gorgik's campaign against the institution of slavery
that bothers the ruling class (since that institution was dying anyway, of 'nat
ural' economic causes); '[r]ather, it was the radicalness of his appearance that
had bothered the nobles, merchants, and their conservative employees - not
the Liberator's practice so much as his potential; for appearances are signs of
possibilities' (Delany 1985: 9). We cannot afford to discount the significance of
this point, because the Neveryon books, like much of Delany's writing, operate
within a semiotic system which is informed by the poststructuralist theories of
people like Foucault. Within such a semiotic system, the most significant poli
tical acts are likely to occur not on the material level of political economy, but
on the level of sign and symbol. In this respect, as in many others, Delany's
work is postanarchist. Jes Battis has recently noted the specifically kinky
valence of Gorgik's semiotic system: 'it is through S/M sexuality ... that
Gorgik stages political interventions within the gendered order of his own
world' (Battis 2009: 480). A semiotic system like this demands that we take
seriously arguments such as the one that Gorgik advances: 'As one word
uttered in three different situations may mean three entirely different things, so
the collar worn in three different situations may mean three different things.
They are not the same: sex, affection, and society' (Delany 1979: 238). By
developing this radically contextual theory of semiotics and symbolism,
Gorgik (and Delany) resolve the apparent contradiction which Fox believes he
has identified. The symbolic redemption of slavery from the semiotic and
ethical abyss in which it lingers is a crucial part of Delany's project. Jeffrey
Allen Tucker is right to suggest that 'Gorgik became a revolutionary who
sought to attain for himself and all slaves in Neveryon the power to wrest
symbolic control of the slave collar from the aristocracy and the freedom
to shift the significance of the collar from one context to another' (Tucker
2004: 148). This is the apex of Delany's kinky poststructuralist anarchism:
freedom is defined here as the power to create context, the right to signify freely.
But if we wish to observe the full realisation of Delany's theory of erotic
power, we must Return to Neveryon. In a book by that name (originally
published as The Bridge of Lost Desire in 1987), Delany brings his philosophy
of power as close to a conclusion as such an open-ended theoretical project
could come. In 'The Game of Time and Pain', a tale set shortly after the lib
eration of Neveryon's slaves, we learn that S/M is 'one of the more common
perversions in a Neveryon so recently awakened from a troubling dream of
slaves' (Delany 1987: 24). Here Delany makes explicit the historical connection
between non-consensual socio-economic slavery and its consensual erotic
reflection. This connection might seem to have ominous ethical implications
for play-slavery. But here it is crucial to consider Delany's philosophy of his
tory. In Return to Neveryon, he assures us that history, 'despite our masters, is
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never inevitable, only more or less negotiable' (ibid.: 34).7 Delany goes on to
argue that history must 'be founded as richly on desire as on memory' (ibid.: 74).
His argument points towards a radically subjective form of history - indeed, it
suggests a kind of Lacanian history. After all, Lacan saw desire as the Freudian
version of the Cartesian cogito: the 'nodal point' where subjectivity occurs
(Lacan 1981: 154). Delany's work suggests that history is experienced by this
desiring subject. 8 But what might such a negotiated, subjective, desiring history
look like? Clearly, such a history would involve what Nietzsche called a
'revaluation of all values' (Nietzsche 1969: 254, 310-13). Thus Delany's Gorgik
dreams of 'a land of wholly inverted values where the very sign of my
servitude, the iron at my neck, would be taken by all I met as a symbol of
transcendent freedom' (Delany 1987: 34).
For Gorgik and for other citizens of Neveryon, such an inversion of values
is inherently political. For us it is anarchist: as always, the relevant politics are
the politics of consent and desire. Delany's storytelling emphatically demon
strates that non-consensual socio-economic slavery cannot be erotic. Gorgik
recalls an erotic moment which he experienced when he was still a slave.
Temporarily uncollared, Gorgik watched an aristocrat place a slave collar
around his own neck - and Gorgik felt desire. But when the aristocrat dis
covered that Gorgik was watching, he quickly moved to re-collar the slave.
Gorgik speaks of the collar: 'And just as I had recognized the sexual in his
placing of it about his own neck, I knew that, though lust still reeled in
his body and still staggered in mine, this gesture was as empty of the sexual as
it is possible for a human gesture to be' (ibid.: 54). The fundamental realisa
tion that no reconciliation is possible between socio-economic slavery and
play-slavery sets Gorgik on the path to true knowledge and true freedom. For
this is what Gorgik learned that night in the aristocrat's tent: 'I knew, at least
for me, that the power to remove the collar was wholly involved with the
freedom to place it there when I wished. And, wanting it, I knew, for the first
time since I'd been brought to the mines - indeed, for the first time in my life
the self that want defined' (ibid.: 57). Here Gorgik is announcing a rather
remarkable epistemological revolution. It is a revolution of the Lacanian vari
ety, in which the self is actually constituted through desire - and, indeed,
through a specifically fetishistic desire, as Georgia Johnston has noted (John
ston 2007: 54). But what is truly significant here is not merely the creation of a
desiring subject, but rather the fact that through desire this self called Gorgik
is set free for the first time in his life. And he is free (indeed, there is a 'he'
who can be free) because he has the power to give that freedom up willingly. It
is important to note that the 'he' created in this way is not the self sought by
modern humanism or the liberal state, for it was Lacanian desire that brought
Gorgik into existence, rather than any rationalist Cartesian cogito.
Perhaps the meaning of Gorgik, then, is freedom - at least for those "€itizens
of Neveryon who recognise that the ethical wound of non-consensual slavery
can be healed, in part, through the consensual exchange of erotic power. For
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them, as for Gorgik, consent and desire are the razor-sharp blades which
separate the ethical from the criminal, the erotic from the economic.
As Neveryon awakens from its nightmare of non-consensual slavery, its S/M
community flourishes. 'When I was free,' old Gorgik tells his would-be lover,
'I learned that the power, the freedom, the pleasures you and I would indulge
here tonight take place within the laws of a marginal society and an eccentric
civility that allows us to grasp them, one and the other, with a stunning force
and joy that whoever skulks after them like a slave cannot imagine' (Delany
1987: 65). As always, Delany celebrates marginality: explicitly, the marginality
of the kinky community, but also Gorgik's and perhaps Delany's own. If
Delany's work has a utopian moment, it is surely this. In liberated Neveryon,
Delany dreams of (and Gorgik remembers) a world in which power flows in
accordance with the rules of civility and desire. It is a world which recognises
the inevitability of power, and simply insists that such power be used ethically.
Delany's work, like Butler's, embodies an attempt to describe a range of
ethical power relations. The basic rule for both authors is that these relations
must be consensual and desired. In this sense, their projects are fundamentally
anarchistic. But Butler and Delany also represent the culmination of a theore
tical tradition which began when Masoch added the concept of consent to the
philosophy of erotic power, thus creating the category of practices and strate
gies which would eventually come to be known as BDSM. 9 Of course, Butler
and Delany are interesting not merely because they make innovative cofltribu
tions to kink theory via the medium of paraliterary genre fiction - though that
certainly would be a remarkable enough achievement in its own right. Butler
and Delany also expand, enhance and refine kink theory. Surely the most sig
nificant contribution which Butler and Delany make to our understanding of
po~erges from their reappropriation of the master-slave dynamic. Rela
tionships such as that of Doro and Anyanwu, or Gorgik and Small Sarg, show,
as no amount of dialectical thinking ever could, that there is, after all, a kind
of mutual reciprocity to such relationships. Most crucially, Butler and Delany
give us, through the principle of consent and the practice of mutual desire, a
set of tools which we may use to distinguish unethical slavery from ethical
play-slavery. This may well turn out to be their lasting contribution to
the philosophy of power and to the erotic practices which flow from that
philosophy.

Notes
1 I use the phrase 'speculative fiction' rather than 'science fiction' so that Delany's
Neveryon books, which describe vital components of his philosophy of power, may
be included in the discussion.
2 Sadly, Marxism is no help here. As Rubin points out, 'the issue of consent has been
clouded by an overly hasty application of Marxian critiques of bourgeois contract
theory to sex law and practice' (Rubin 1982: 222). So liberalism and Marxism share
the suspicion that kink can't be consensual. But the anarchist concept of consent,
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which is broader, deeper and more open than those of most other political philo
sophies, may have room for kink.
3 Mistress Venus recognises that if there is a reactionary danger in what she does, that
comes from the fact that her kink is inscribed within the structures of capitalist
exchange. It is 'capitalism, not kink, that promotes 'body fascism' (Anarchist
Federation 2002: 8). '
4 See White (1985) for a good account of the enormous dilemmas which female slaves
faced, especially with respect to issues of sexuality and reproduction.
5 In a well-known section from The Phenomenology of Mind entitled 'Lordship and
Bondage', Hegel examined the richly intricate ways in which masters and slaves
corne to depend upon one another. He concluded that since the consciousness of the
master must always be mediated through the consciousness of the slave, the master
cannot attain true independence, but only a 'dependent consciousness' (Hegel 1967:
234ff).

6 Moser and Kleinplatz (2005) have argued eloquently, however, that the American
Psychiatric Association should remove sexual sadism and sexual masochism from its
DSM. Although the paraphilias will likely remain in the DSM, the proposed revi
sions to DSM-5 would distinguish paraphilias from paraphilic disorders. This is
meant to reflect a consensus among clinicians that paraphilias such as sexual sadism
or sexual masochism 'are not ipso facto psychiatric disorders' (American Psychiatric
Association 2010).
7 The emphasis which Delany places on negotiation is not surprising. Real world S/M
communities, including the California communities with which I am most familiar,
often regard negotiation as one of the most important skills. Jay Wiseman calls it
the most important (Wiseman 1996: 57). Pat Califia points out that the community
uses negotiation for everything from individual scenes to entire relationships (Califia
2001: 25).
8 It's interesting to note here that Lacan said of the analytic method that 'its opera
tions are those of history' (Lacan 1968: 19).
9 Masoch used the mechanism of the contract to explore the concept of consent in his
famous erotic novel Venus in Furs (von Sacher-Masoch 1991 [1870]).
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